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The impact of public employment on private sector activity:  
Evidence from Berlin 
 
 
Abstract 
We use the move of the seat of the German government from Bonn to Berlin in 1999 to test 
competing views about the impact of public employment on private sector activity in a local labor 
market. Using employment data from a 50% sample of establishments across 190 Berlin postcodes, 
we apply a treatment intensity approach which takes the possibility of spillovers into account. 
Results indicate that the arrival of 100 public sector jobs into an area generates 55 additional jobs 
in the private sector. There is evidence of spillovers: relocations up to a distance of 1km from a 
postcode boundary increases employment in the private sector by 36 jobs. These effects are coming 
through job gains in the service sector, while manufacturing employment is not influenced by the 
relocation.  
 
JEL classification: R23, R58, J61, O1 
Keywords: Regional labor markets; regional government policy; job displacement; economic 
development 
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I. Introduction 
 Substantial differences in economic performance exist within and across countries. To 
explain this spatial inequality, the economic geography literature has focused on the location of 
private sector activity. This emphasis is justified by the fact that decisions in the private sector are 
largely driven by market forces whereas decisions in the public sector respond to multiple 
objectives. Nevertheless, shifting the focus from looking exclusively at the private sector to 
examining the interaction between public and private employment would be important for, at least, 
three reasons. First, public employment accounts for a substantial share of total employment in 
most OECD countries (21.3% on average in 2013). According to the latest estimates (see OECD, 
2015), the size of public sector employment is 23.5%, 19.8% and 15.4% in the UK, France and 
Germany, respectively. Second, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, some austerity measures 
were introduced in the form of public sector job cuts, with the hope that by reducing the size of the 
public sector in an area, private activity would return and flourish. Scarce empirical evidence exists 
of these claims. Third, governments have frequently used relocation programs of public sector 
workers as a tool to address employment problems in declining regions (see Jefferson and Trainor, 
1996). Advocates of these policies suggest that job relocation triggers local multiplier effects and 
therefore boosts regional economic performance. The arrival of public sector jobs in an area may 
increase demand for locally-produced goods and services (see Moretti, 2010; Faggio and Overman, 
2014). Opponents to this view stress that the new jobs merely crowd out existing ones. Higher 
housing rents increase local production costs which impede new businesses to form or hamper 
existing businesses’ competitiveness. These crowding-out effects may be stronger than the 
multiplier effects. Evidence on the economic impact of relocation policies is, however, limited (see 
Faggio, 2015). 
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 This project uses the move of the German government from Bonn to Berlin at the end of 
the 1990s in order to investigate the interaction between public and private employment within a 
local labor market. Our objective is to identify which effect (multiplier or crowding-out) prevails 
when public sector jobs are relocated into small local areas. We conduct the analysis at a fine 
geographical scale (190 Berlin postcodes) and exploit the spatial and temporal variation in the data. 
We use information from the German Establishment History Panel that comprises a 50% sample 
of Berlin establishments with at least 1 employee from 1992 to 2010. Analyses of this kind are 
complicated by two factors: (1) the geographical spread of the policy is not known a priori; and 
(2) locations are not randomly chosen. To solve these issues, we construct a set of treatment 
intensity variables adapting from Gibbons et al. (2011) and Faggio (2015). We also control for 
initial (pre-treatment) economic and demographic characteristics at the postcode level. Our 
empirical strategy is a treatment intensity approach that takes the possibility of local spillovers into 
account. We compare employment changes in postcodes that have received the relocated jobs 
relative to postcodes that have not received them; we also compare employment changes in 
postcodes in proximity to a relocation site relative to postcodes at an increasing distance to a 
relocation site. In doing so, we evaluate the effects before and after the implementation of (a large 
part of) the relocation program. 
 We find that the arrival of 100 public sector jobs into an area generates 55 additional jobs 
in the private sector. There is evidence of spillovers: the inflow of 100 public sector jobs into an 
area also triggers job creation (36 new jobs) in areas neighboring the relocation site. These effects 
are coming through job gains in the service sector, while manufacturing employment is not 
influenced by the relocation. In addition, we find that agglomeration effects are highly localized 
within the first few kilometers from a relocation site and disappear sharply over distance. Our 
results are robust to a series of checks and extensions: we verify that the multiplier effects we detect 
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are indeed due to the relocation program and not to other transformation processes that were 
triggered by the reunification. We show, in fact, that the employment dynamics prior to the 
relocation differ substantially from those observed during the period of the government move, so 
indicating a structural break. We also rule out the possibility that our estimates are driven by the 
expansion of the city centre after the fall of the Berlin Wall by looking at the evolution of the CBD 
(central business district) expansion over time. Moreover, we rule out the possibility that the rise 
in private sector employment is due to a few large companies that relocated their headquarters near 
the new seat of the government by focusing on SME employment only.  Furthermore, we replicate 
the analysis by using distance weighting functions instead of our measures of treatment intensity. 
Results seem to hold.  
 This paper contributes to an emerging literature examining the interaction between public 
and private sector employment within a local labor market. Faggio and Overman (2014) made a 
first attempt to look at the impact of public employment on private sector activity. Analyzing 
changes in total public sector employment for 352 English Local Authorities during the period 
2003-2007, they find that public sector growth does not have any impact on total private sector 
growth. It changes, however, the local composition of private sector jobs by increasing the share 
of services. Faggio (2015) analyzes the effect of a public sector relocation program on a very 
detailed geographical scale using 160,000 UK Census Output Areas. She finds that public 
employment has a positive impact on private sector employment and it changes the composition of 
local private sector jobs towards services and away from manufacturing. She also finds that the 
program has highly localized effects that disappear quickly over distance. Becker et al. (2015) 
evaluate the impact of public employment on private sector activity using the move of the German 
government to Bonn after World War II (WWII) as a source of exogenous variation. They find that 
total employment and population in Bonn substantially increased after 1949 relative to a group of 
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40 control cities. Because of data limitations, they cannot fully investigate the impact of public 
employment on the sectoral composition of local jobs. Jofre-Monseny et al. (2016) estimate the 
effects of public job expansions on decennial changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the 
employment and population of Spanish cities. They find that one additional public sector job 
creates about 1.3 jobs in the private sector. They also point out that these new jobs do not translate 
into a substantial reduction in local unemployment as better labor market conditions attract new 
workers to the city.1 
 The paper also makes a contribution to the literature on local multipliers. Moretti (2010) 
quantifies the long-term changes in the number of jobs in a city’s tradable and non-tradable sectors 
generated by a permanent increase in the number of jobs in the tradable sector. He finds that, in the 
US, 100 additional jobs in the tradable sector increase employment in the non-tradable sector by 
160 jobs, whereas it has no effect on employment in other parts of the tradable sector. A similar 
study compares US figures to those for Sweden, here the multiplier effect amounts to 48 jobs for 
100 additional jobs in the tradable sector (Moretti and Thulin, 2013). In contrast to our focus here, 
Moretti’s definition of the non-tradable sector specifically excludes government jobs (along with 
those in agriculture, mining and the military). Thus, his papers are mainly concerned with 
multiplier effects between tradable and non-tradable components of the private sector. Looking at 
the openings of Wal-Mart stores at the US county level, Basker (2005) estimates large and positive 
                                                     
1
 In the macro-economic literature, a limited number of studies use OECD country data and look at the potential impact 
of public sector employment on labor market outcomes (e.g., unemployment and private employment), often finding 
contradictory results. Whereas Edin and Holmlund (1997) show that a rise in public sector employment reduces 
unemployment, Boeri et al. (2000) and Algan et al. (2002) find the opposite effect as public sector employment in the 
long-run destroys private sector jobs. 
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direct effects on retail employment in the first year of entry, which are cut in half after five years. 
She detects no spillover effects in retail sectors in which Wal-Mart does not compete directly.  
 In addition, our work is related to studies that use German division and reunification as 
historical natural experiments and examine their impact on the spatial distribution of economic 
activity.2 Redding and Sturm (2008) exploit the division of Germany after WWII and the 
reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 to examine the changes in market access for the 
growth of West German cities. Redding et al. (2011) explain the relocation of Germany’s air hub 
from Berlin to Frankfurt in response to the country’s division after WWII as a shift between 
multiple steady-state equilibria. Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) develop a quantitative model of internal city 
structure that accounts for the observed changes in the location of economy activity within West 
Berlin following the city’s division and reunification. As already mentioned, Becker et al. (2015) 
is another study of this kind. 
Moreover, the paper contributes to a growing literature documenting the rapid spatial decay 
of agglomeration effects. Looking at the impact of additional employees on small new 
establishments in the US, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) suggest that external economies of 
agglomeration are sharply attenuated by distance. When studying the case of New York City, 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) document significant productivity gains from the co-location of 
advertising firms in Manhattan, but these gains attenuate rapidly over space. Turning to Sweden, 
Andersson et al. (2004, 2009) investigate the impact of university decentralization and find 
                                                     
2
 Several studies examine the impact of historical natural experiments on the location of economic activity: e.g., Hanson 
(1996, 1997) using Mexican trade liberalization; David and Weinstein (2002, 2008) using bombing of Japan in WWII; 
and Kline and Moretti (2014) using the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Here, we focus on those using 
German division and reunification. 
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substantial but highly localized spillovers on firm productivity over distance. Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) 
find highly localized production and residential externalities using within-Berlin census block data.  
 Our study is of considerable interest for policy makers. It gives evidence on the suitability 
of public sector relocation programs to address local employment problems. Despite the fact that 
governments frequently use these policies, evidence of their impact is scarce. The project also helps 
to understand uneven spatial effects of changes in public sector employment, which are relevant 
for both public sector job creation and destruction – another highly debated topic. Furthermore, our 
project is highly relevant as a case study. The 1994 Bonn-Berlin Act specified that 50% of 
government employees have to remain in Bonn. Whether the law should be changed is frequently 
debated. This study helps to shed light on the possible impact for Bonn and Berlin should the 
German government decide to move the remaining ministries.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an overview of the 
historical setting and provides details on the relocation. Section III discusses our empirical strategy. 
Section IV describes the data underlying the analysis and their sources. Section V presents the 
results and Section VI concludes. 
II. Historical setting 
A. Overview 
 When Germany lost WWII, the country was divided into four sectors administered by the 
Four Powers, namely the US, Russia, France and the UK. Similarly, the city of Berlin, which was 
the capital of Germany between 1871 and 1945, was jointly occupied. The cooling of the political 
climate between the Western powers and Russia led to the division of Germany in 1949 into the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GRD). Berlin was 
claimed by both states resulting in the situation shown in Figure 2. Though Berlin was located 
within the GDR boundaries about 130 kilometers away from the West German territory, the West-
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Berlin zones occupied by the US, France and the UK became part of the FRG. Conversely, the 
East-Berlin zone occupied by Russia became part of the GDR. From the West-German perspective 
the former capital was isolated and therefore unsuitable for government functions. Under the 
promise that Berlin would be made capital again as soon as the political situation changed, Bonn 
was chosen as the new capital and seat of the FRG government. 
 This ‘provisional’ situation lasted until reunification in 1990. A clause in the Unification 
Treaty (1990) signed by the GDR and the FGR agreed on making Berlin again capital of united 
Germany. A year later it was decided to move the seat of the government back from Bonn to Berlin. 
The decision was unpopular and could only be reached by making large concessions to the city of 
Bonn, to compensate for the loss of status and economic power. Part of the agreement was a ‘fair 
division of labor’ between Berlin and Bonn, implying that core government functions should take 
their seat in Berlin but the majority of government jobs should remain in Bonn. Additionally, Bonn 
should receive financial compensation as well as new functions and institutions of national and 
international significance.3 The initial plan was to move the government to Berlin within four years 
and to fully complete the move within at most twelve years (Deutscher Bundestag, 1991a). 
 Details on the implementation of the move were left open. By 1992 it became clear that 
moving the core government functions within four years was unfeasible. What followed was a long 
discussion about the timing of the move and its costs. One motion proposed to stop any further 
government related investment in Berlin until the financial situation of the FRG had improved. 
Another proposed to postpone the move until 2010. Furthermore, a mass petition was organized to 
                                                     
3
 The ability of Bonn to secure large (financial and non-financial) concessions as a form of compensation for the loss 
of status and economic power makes it difficult to estimate the impact of the move of the seat of the government on 
Bonn. In addition, there are data limitations. With only 17 postcode areas (the smallest geographical unit available in 
our data) in Bonn, it is unlikely that our identification strategy for local shocks would work. 
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suspend a decision about the date of the move until the government had full knowledge of the costs 
and the financial situation of the state (Bund) and federal states (Länder) had improved (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2010). The dispute created uncertainty among private companies that had started to 
invest in Berlin. In November 1993, 40 national and international companies pointed at the breach 
of trust should the government cease its effort to press ahead with the move (Hoffman, 1998, p. 
213).4 
 The passing of the Berlin-Bonn Act (1994) provided statutory security about the move to 
Berlin. Though it did not specify a concrete moving date, the act determined important details of 
the implementation of the move such as the definition of a ‘fair division of labor’ between Berlin 
and Bonn and concrete compensatory measures for the former capital. Six ministries should keep 
their first seat in Bonn5 and get a second seat in Berlin; nine ministries should take their first seat 
in Berlin and keep their second seat in Bonn. Additionally, it was decided that the majority of 
ministerial positions were to remain in Bonn. It was only by November 1997 that the Federal 
Parliament (Bundestag) announced a moving date. The government was to take up its work in 
                                                     
4
 Since some company headquarters were relocated to the centre of Berlin after the government decision, we are 
concerned that their presence could drive our results. As a robustness check, we re-estimate our model focusing on 
SME employment only. Results do not change (see Section V.D). 
5
 These six ministries are as follows: the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg); the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG); 
the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV); the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ); the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (BMU); the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). 
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Berlin in September 1999. Until then the timing had remained heavily debated.6 A timeline 
summarizing the core events of the decision making process is shown in Figure 1.7 
B. The magnitude of the relocation 
The Bundestag and the government officially started their work in Berlin in September 
1999. Table 1 gives an overview of the number of jobs relocated from Bonn to Berlin. In total, the 
move involved about 15,000 government-related jobs. An additional 10,000 positions related to 
foreign representations, the media, political parties and interest groups followed suit. At the same 
time, Berlin experienced significant outflows of public sector jobs. Following the 
recommendations of a commission established to oversee the redistribution of federal offices across 
the federal states that used to be part of the GDR (‘new Länder’), several Berlin-based institutions 
left the city and relocated in these new Länder. Berlin also lost several of its institutions to 
compensate Bonn for its employment losses (see Figure 2, right panel). Adding up positive and 
negative job moves results in a net gain of about 18,000 jobs for Berlin. Those jobs did not 
correspond to the number of relocated workers as employees were given the choice whether they 
would like to follow their job or take up a position in one of the federal institutions that remained 
in Bonn or were relocated to Bonn as part of the compensation measures.8 
C. The timing of the relocation 
The relocation period was spread across several years, though the majority of jobs had 
moved by the official relocation date or shortly after as can be seen in Figure 3. Government 
                                                     
6
 In September 1996, for instance, 50 MPs belonging to the SPD and BÜNDIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN brought in the 
motion to postpone the move by at least 5 years. 
7
 A more detailed description of events is provided in Appendix A.1. 
8
 Approximately 34% of government employees decided to stay in Bonn; most of them were public sector workers of 
lower or middle grade (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999). 
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employees largely moved between 1999 and 2000 (see Figure 3, Panel C). By the end of 2000, 
more than 8,000 ministerial employees as well as about 5,300 employees of the administration of 
the federal parliament, parliamentary groups or deputies and their assistants were located in Berlin. 
All federal states equally established a representation in Berlin. The majority of embassies chose 
to be present in Berlin when the government took up its work in 1999 and many more arrived in 
the following years (Panel A). Some of them had made short-term arrangements to accommodate 
their staff such as renting offices or using facilities of their consulate generals and branch offices 
as well as former military missions until they could rebuild or construct a suitable building for their 
representations (Gehrcken, 2013). The relocation of institutions out of Berlin is comparatively 
spread, taking place between 1996 and 2003 (Panel B). 
D. Location decisions within the city of Berlin 
Location decisions for government institutions were heavily debated. While the airport of 
Tempelhof was proposed as a possible site for parliament due to the availability of unbuilt land, 
the final site was chosen for historical reasons. To keep the costs of the move as low as possible, 
many ministries were accommodated in the existing housing stock. As noted above, embassies 
used the facilities of their consulate generals, branch offices or former military missions. Although 
the diplomatic building stock in West-Berlin had been almost entirely destroyed between 1939 and 
19459, many countries still owned parcels of land in Berlin that they had purchased more than a 
century ago. The former embassies in the GDR located in Berlin-East had closed in 1990 and were 
used as consulates. Some reopened later on as representations in the FRG. By 2015, 163 states are 
                                                     
9
 During the construction works for the capital ‘Germania’ under the Nazi regime, several embassies had been 
demolished. For some the planned reconstruction never materialized as diplomatic relations broke off during WWII. 
In addition, severe bomb attacks destroyed a large number of buildings in the Tiergartenviertel, the neighborhood 
where embassies were historically located (Fleischmann, 2005). 
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represented in Berlin by 158 embassies and 5 honorary consulates. It was therefore mainly 
historical factors that determined the location patterns of the government and related institutions. 
This institutional detail is very important for our empirical analysis. Although relocated jobs were 
not randomly distributed across space, the choice of government buildings was not related to pre-
existing economic and social conditions of postcode areas within Berlin. Instead, it was largely 
driven by historical considerations, i.e. by the desire of the government to occupy (where possible) 
buildings of historical importance (see Section III for more details). Table 2 reports descriptive 
statistics between the groups of Berlin postcodes receiving and non-receiving relocated jobs during 
the period 1999 and 2001. The table shows that receiving postcodes (in the number of 38)10 have 
a higher number of jobs and characterized by larger shares of female, part-time and highly qualified 
workers, especially professionals. Conversely, the age structure of the workforce as well as the 
proportion of managers and skilled workers are similar between the two groups of receiving and 
non-receiving postcodes.  
III. Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in the change in private sector employment after the relocation of public 
sector jobs to Berlin. A change in private sector jobs can either arise through existing firms hiring 
or laying off workers or firms entering or leaving an area within the labor market. To capture both 
channels, we aggregate firm level data up to the postcode level, which is the lowest level of 
geography available in our data.  
Studies that look at the effect of job relocations are complicated by two factors. First, the 
geographical spread of the policy is unknown a priori. Second, locations are not randomly chosen. 
                                                     
10
 Since we focus on net changes, receiving postcodes include 30 postcodes affected by a positive public sector 
employment shock and 8 postcodes affected by a negative shock. 
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To deal with these issues, we construct a measure of treatment intensity that is a non-parametric 
function of the distance to a relocation site. Adapting from Gibbons et al. (2011) and Faggio (2015), 
we construct treatment intensity variables as the number of relocated jobs within each postcode as 
well as the number of relocated jobs in subsequent 1km-wide distance bands starting from the 
postcode boundary. This approach allows the relocation of public sector institutions and public 
sector jobs into an area to affect neighboring areas and its impact to differ by distance. For instance, 
local businesses like cafés, restaurants or other local services might benefit from a higher number 
of customers in the area and thus hire more workers. It might also be the case that firms offering 
consulting or legal services decide to relocate after the intervention in order to benefit from 
proximity to the public sector. As a consequence, the number of jobs would increase in areas close 
to public sector institutions and would decrease in areas further away.  
As noted before, to the extent that relocations of public sector workers are used as policies targeted 
at improving local employment conditions, locations are not randomly chosen. This has 
consequences in terms of identification. We argue that this concern is much weaker in our analysis 
than in related studies as the relocation of the government from Bonn to Berlin was not aiming at 
improving local economic conditions in specific neighborhoods. As discussed in Section II, 
location decisions were largely determined by historical factors. The seat of the government was 
chosen to be located next to the former Reichstagsbuilding, embassies moved to their own branch 
offices and built on their own parcels of land dating back to the time of the German empire or (in 
the former East) dating back to the 1970s when the GDR was internationally acknowledged. 
Federal institutions selected to compensate Bonn for its loss of economic status and employment 
were chosen to allow government employees who did not want to move to Berlin to keep a similar 
 13 
 
position in Bonn (Bornhöft et al., 2001).11 Their specific location in Berlin was not a factor in the 
decision making process. Still, due to the sheer size of the relocation, one of the necessary 
conditions was the availability of a sufficiently large number of offices or buildings suitable to be 
converted into offices and land suitable for the construction of the main government buildings. In 
our empirical analysis, we partly address these issues by controlling for time-invariant postcode 
characteristics and for differences in pre-existing employment trends. 
We apply a treatment intensity estimation approach, which allows areas to be treated at a 
different level of intensity instead of assuming a constant treatment effect (see Angrist and Imbens, 
1995). In other words, the approach combines (or replaces) a treatment dummy, typical of a 
standard difference-in-differences approach, with treatment intensity variables. In formal terms, 
this study investigates the impact of a treatment variable and several treatment intensity variables 
on outcome (e.g., local private sector employment) using the following estimation equation: 
 ∆���ݒ௣,௧ = �଴∆�ݑܾ௣,௧଴ + ∑ �ௗ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ௗ଺ௗ=ଵ + ∑ ߜ௝�௣,௧−௡௝�௝=ଵ + ∆ߝ௣,௧   (1) 
 
where ∆ denotes a long lag operator, i.e. ∆���ݒ௣,௧ =  ���ݒ௣,௧ −  ���ݒ௣,௧−௡. Specifically, ∆���ݒ௣,௧ refers 
to the change in private sector employment between time t and t-n in postcode p; ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧଴  denotes 
the number of public sector jobs a postcode p received between time t and t-n; and ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ௗ  refers 
to the number of jobs relocated a postcode p faces within distance band d, with ݀ ≥ ͳ. Since a 
postcode p could be hit by positive and negative flows of public sector workers during the sample 
period, both ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧଴  and ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ௗ  measure net employment changes. Equation (1) is augmented by 
                                                     
11
 For example, the Federal Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt) was relocated to Bonn to provide alternative 
employment to employees of the Ministry of Finance. All these location decisions were independent of the local 
employment situation in Berlin. 
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a set of control variables denoted by the vector �௣,௧−௡௝ , which includes the log of total employment, 
the shares of female and part-time workers, the age structure of the workforce, the distribution of 
occupation and education groups. All control variables are measured at the initial level (t-n). ∆ߝ௣,௧ 
refers to the error term. 
In the main specification, the outcome variable (∆���ݒ௣,௧) refers to the raw changes in 
private sector employment between 1998 and 2002, i.e. ݐ = ʹͲͲʹ and ݐ − ݊ = ͳͻͻͺ. As shown in 
Figure 3, net public sector job turnover (see Figure 3, Panel D) in Berlin was highest in 1999 and 
2000. Thus, the chosen interval corresponds to the years just before and after the most intensive 
treatment period. A short time span is also of advantage, especially in the case of Berlin which has 
been going through a deep structural change during the 1990s and 2000s, making it less likely that 
ongoing trends could confound our estimates.  
The first treatment variable ሺ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧଴  ሻ identifies the treatment effect on postcodes that 
received public sector jobs during the 1999-2001 period relative to areas that did not receive such 
jobs. This is equivalent (apart from measuring the size of the relocation rather than the status of 
being treated) to a typical treatment dummy in a standard difference-in-differences approach. If the 
analysis focused exclusively on this variable, it would only capture the policy impact on receiving 
areas. By introducing treatment intensity variables, the analysis allows for potential spillovers 
effects into neighboring areas to be identified. 
Treatment intensity variables (∑ �ௗ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ௗ଺ௗ=ଵ ) capture indirect or spillover effects by 
counting the number of relocated jobs within distance bands. Faggio (2015) constructs 1km-wide 
distance bands starting from an area centroid; we construct 1km-wide distance bands starting from 
the postcode boundaries. This modification is necessary in order to take into account that postcode 
areas in Berlin largely vary by size. To avoid collinearity problems, a second modification proves 
necessary. We treat the two central postcodes (10117 and 10557 in Berlin Mitte) as "seed" locations 
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only, i.e. they are affected by the number of jobs they receive (direct effect), but they are not 
affected by the number of jobs relocated in surrounding postcodes (indirect effect). Given the 
intensity of the direct treatment these two postcodes received (see Figure 4), spillovers are less 
likely to explain employment growth within these postcodes.  
Using ArcGIS we construct five subsequent 1km-wide rings and an additional ring ranging 
from 5km to 15km. In doing so, we aim to detect any effect within the first five kilometres from a 
postcode boundary while covering the whole surface of Berlin. By geocoding the exact location of 
each institution that received public sector jobs, we can count the number of jobs that fall into each 
ring. Thus, we make the assumption that the effects are additive. We then measure treatment 
intensity variables as the interactions between distance and size, where size refers to the number of 
jobs moved. 
Our treatment intensity variables are constructed in a cumulative way: ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ଵ  refers to all 
relocations (and the associated number of jobs moved) within a 0-1km distance band, but outside 
the postcode boundary.12 The comparison group consists of postcodes that do not face relocations 
within the 0-1km band, but face relocations at a greater distance. ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ଶ  refers to all relocations 
within a 0-2km distance band (which also includes relocations considered in the 0-1km ring) 
relative to areas that face relocations further away. The comparison group now consists of 
postcodes that do not face relocations within the 0-2km band, but face relocations at a greater 
distance. ∆�ݑܾ௣,௧ଷ  refers to all relocations within 0-3km band (which also includes relocations 
considered in the 0-1km and 1-2km rings) relative to areas that face relocations further away, and 
so forth. The sixth ring (∆�ݑܾ௣,௧଺ ) refers to all relocations within a 0-15km distance band from the 
postcode boundary. We make sure we include all jobs moved such that our rings are exhaustive. 
                                                     
12
 In other words, ∆�ݑܾ଴ is not included in ∆�ݑܾଵ (and subsequent ∆�ݑܾௗ). 
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Using separate 1km-wide (rather than cumulative) rings in Equation (1) would lead to the 
same findings. The actual estimates in the two specifications would be different, but it would be 
possible to derive estimates of one specification from those of the other. The main advantage of 
using a cumulative definition of treatment intensity variables is that it simplifies the comparison 
across coefficients and thus the interpretation of the results. Each coefficient (�ௗ) captures the 
marginal effect of each additional treatment intensity d included in the estimation. No t-test 
between �ௗ and �ௗ−ଵ would be necessary in order to verify whether the impact of the two treatment 
intensity variables are significantly different from each other.13 
In Equation (1), we estimate the effects of changes in the number of public sector jobs on 
changes in the number of private sector jobs, when those changes occur simultaneously. In the 
robustness section, we explore the possibility of long-term effects by looking at differences over a 
longer time period.  
While our method is capable of identifying a localized public employment multiplier and 
its spatial reach, it cannot distinguish between jobs moving within Berlin and jobs being filled with 
                                                     
13
 Consider cumulative distance bands defined as: ݕ = ܾଵݔ଴−ହ + ܾଶݔ଴−ଵହ + ܾଷݔ଴−ଷ଴ 
Then, non-cumulative distance bands can be defined as: ݕ = ሺܾଵ + ܾଶ + ܾଷሻݔ଴−ହ + ሺܾଶ + ܾଷሻݔହ−ଵହ + ܾଷݔଵହ−ଷ଴ 
Because: ݔ଴−ଷ଴ =  ݔ଴−ହ + ݔହ−ଵହ + ݔଵହ−ଷ଴ ݔ଴−ଵହ =  ݔ଴−ହ + ݔହ−ଵହ 
The cumulative specification gives coefficients which capture the direct impact of each band (b1, b2 and b3) on the 
variable of interest. Conversely, the non-cumulative specification of distance bands needs to be followed by t-tests on 
the equality of the coefficients for the different distance bands. 
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workers from outside Berlin or from the formerly unemployed. Thus, strictly speaking, we cannot 
test whether overall employment in Berlin is higher with the government move than in an 
alternative scenario without. We experimented with the synthetic control group approach in order 
to find the effect on total private sector employment. This method requires a long time series, 
however, which is only available for Western Berlin and not for the former East. Also, as the years 
after 1990 were strongly influenced by reunification, the construction of a reasonable control group 
from other German cities is unfortunately not possible for that time. 
IV. Data  
A. Sources 
 Information on employment is retrieved from the weakly anonymous Establishment 
History Panel (EHP) (see Gruhl et al., 2012). The dataset is assembled by the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) and holds information on a 50% random sample of all German 
establishments employing at least one worker on social security records. The time span of the panel 
ranges from 1975 to 2010 for former West-Germany and from 1991 to 2010 for the New Länder. 
The data include information on the total number of employees for each establishment and the 
number of employees in each of the following categories: age band, gender, qualification class, 
occupation (1 digit) and nationality. Additional variables include date of market entry and exit as 
well as a time consistent industry classification code (3 digits). 
 For this project, we focus on Berlin and enhance the data set by additional postcode 
information.14 All Berlin establishments were linked to one of 190 Berlin postcodes, which 
represent our unit of analysis. Observations for two postcodes had to be dropped because of 
                                                     
14
 The enhanced dataset is not part of the standard data portfolio of the Research Data Centre. Access for replication 
studies is possible after successful application. Contact the RDC at iab.fdz@iab.de for further advice. 
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confidentiality reasons as the specific postcodes contained less than 20 establishments. Although 
we have establishment level data, worker and address information is not available for every branch. 
More specifically, the procedure for the allocation of establishment IDs in the German Social 
Security System demands that firms pool together all branches (i) located in the same municipality 
and that (ii) operate in the same Economic Class according to the Standard Classification of 
Economic Activities. As an example, multiple branches of the same supermarket chain within 
Berlin show up as just one establishment with one address in our data, presumably the one of the 
head office. This may cause measurement error in the spatial distribution of jobs across postcodes. 
If the head offices were largely located in the city centre but branches were spread across peripheral 
areas, we would overestimate employment in the centre. While we do not have a good estimate of 
how large this measurement error is, we acknowledge that it might be non-negligible.15 We note, 
however, that it should be relatively stable over time and arguably more closely linked to centrality 
per se than the specific distribution of public sector jobs in Berlin. Section V.E on robustness 
checks provides some evidence to support these claims. 
 The official start of government activities in Berlin was September 1, 1999. Estimates of 
the total number of jobs that were destined to relocate were frequently cited in the media as well in 
the general discussion in Parliament. For our analysis, this information is indicative, but of little 
concrete use as the relocation of the government and related institutions along their employees was 
                                                     
15
 According to the IAB Establishment Panel, an annual representative survey of establishments in Germany, about 3 
percent of establishments in Berlin, representing roughly 20 percent of the workforce, are head offices or middle level 
authorities with subordinate branches. Unfortunately, there is no distinction into branches within and outside of Berlin 
(branches in other cities or countries do not bias our distribution of jobs). Keeping in mind that it is attractive for firms 
operating nationally or internationally to have their headquarters located in Berlin, we find it most likely that the share 
of jobs in our data that are potentially incorrectly located is much smaller than 20 percent. 
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spread over a much longer time span and information on the spatial distribution of these jobs within 
Berlin was not provided. Due to lack of official sources on public sector employment, we embarked 
in an extensive data collection exercise, gathering information on three main variables: first, the 
number of jobs of each relocating institution before and after the move; second, the year the 
institution moved in or out of Berlin; and third, the new address of the institution in Berlin or the 
former address in Berlin of those institutions that were relocated to Bonn and the New Länder. We 
also gathered information on the number of government employees working in Berlin in 1997, 
1999, 2001 and 2004. This demanding data collection exercise involved the use of official 
documents (e.g. BT-Drucksachen); nationwide newspapers (e.g. the Spiegel); and local newspapers 
(e.g. the Berliner Zeitung, the Generalanzeiger). 
 We used lists of diplomatic staff published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges 
Amt) to estimate the number of embassy personnel. From these documents, we retrieved the 
number of diplomatic staff in Germany in 1996 and use it as the pre-treatment level. As the 
documents do not contain any information on members of the embassies covering administrative 
or technical support positions, we had to make some assumptions to estimate the total number of 
embassy personnel. We attribute the number of relocated jobs to a Berlin postcode by checking the 
address (in official registers) of the institution receiving employment in a specific year. In the case 
of an institution having multiple sites we attribute all employment to the main address.16 Section 
A.2 in the appendix provides an overview of the data sources used and more detailed information 
on the estimation procedure for the embassy personnel.  
                                                     
16
 Latitude and longitude are added to the data using the online georeference tool provided at: 
http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/geocoder/ 
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 Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of jobs relocated between 1999 and 2001 
across 190 postcodes in Berlin. The map shows aggregate numbers of relocated jobs for each 
postcode. Postcodes differ in size, the median postcode measures about 3 km2, the smallest 
postcode is about 0.4 km2, the largest is about 35 km2. 30 out of 190 postcode received a positive 
public sector employment shock, eight postcodes received a negative shock. Relocated 
employment per postcode ranges from -813 employees in the postcode that lost an important 
federal institution to about 5,200 employees in a postcode in ‘Berlin Mitte’, the most centrally 
located district in Berlin, where several ministries and embassies are clustered. The number of 
treated postcode in West-Berlin is higher than in the East. 
 The number of relocated jobs on either side of the former line of the Berlin Wall is balanced 
though, as the central postcode with the highest number of received public sector workers lies in 
the East. All federal institutions that were moved out of Berlin were geographically spread across 
West-Berlin as they fulfilled administrative tasks for the FRG during the time of division. The eight 
postcodes that lost public sector workers are therefore spread across the western postcodes of the 
city. 
B. Plausibility check 
 We first undergo a plausibility check to verify the consistency between the addresses and 
employment data we collected through independent sources and EHP data on public sector 
employment. Instead of using the change in private sector employment as the outcome variable in 
a specification similar to Equation (1), we regress the (1998-2002) changes in public sector and 
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special interest group employment on the number of relocated jobs related to the government move 
and collected through independent sources.17 Results are presented in Table 3. 
 Table 3 is organized as follows: Columns (1) and (6) report baseline results without 
controls; Columns (2) and (7) include pre-treatment postcode characteristics; Columns (3) and (8) 
include both area characteristics and pre-trends. Pre-trends are defined as the (1995-1997) changes 
in public sector (Column 3) and special interest group (Column 8) employment. Columns (4) and 
(9) augment the specification with a variable measuring the closest distance of the postcode 
centroid to the Berlin Wall; Columns (5) and (10) add a location dummy for West Berlin. Looking 
at Table 3 (Columns 1-5), results indicate that postcodes to which we attribute relocated jobs 
experienced a significant increase in employment in public administration (SIC75) and foreign 
representations (SIC99). If the EHP data comprised all public sector jobs, we would expect a 
coefficient equal to one, i.e. each relocated job in postcode p would increase public sector 
employment in that postcode by one. This cannot be the case because civil servants and foreign 
embassy personnel are not subject to German social security regulations and, thus, they do not 
appear in the EHP.18 It is therefore reasonable to find a coefficient smaller than one (0.802 in 
Column 5). The plausibility test confirms that public sector employment as measured by employees 
in SIC75 and SIC99 registered in social security rolls increased in those areas that received 
government jobs. As expected, there is no evidence of spillover effects. Receiving public sector 
workers in surrounding buffers has no impact.  
                                                     
17
 Special interest group employment is identified as employment recorded in codes 870, 871, 872 and 881 of the 1973 
standard industry code (SIC) classification of economic activities (3-digit). Public sector employment is identified as 
employment recorded in codes 75 and 99 of the 1993 SIC classification (2-digit). 
18
 While some public sector jobs (Angestellte) are subject to German security regulations, others (Beamte) are not. 
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 We were concerned about attributing all relocated jobs to an institution’s primary address 
because of the potential measurement error that could derive. This plausibility check seems to 
confirm that no major spatial measurement error has been introduced. One possible explanation is 
that the majority of jobs might have targeted the institution’s primary location with a small fraction 
moving to secondary locations. Despite this, our data might still suffer from other forms of 
measurement error. For instance, the estimated number of jobs in each embassy is based on a 
number of assumptions. This error will tend to bias our estimates towards zero. The estimates in 
the results section therefore represent lower bounds of the actual effect. 
 We also use Equation (1) to analyze the effect of government relocations on private 
organisations that are directly linked to government activities such as lobbying organisations and 
trade unions. These organisations can be identified looking at the industry codes SIC870-SIC872 
and SIC881 (1973 SIC) in the EHP.19 The media has widely documented that most interest groups 
moved from Bonn to Berlin along with the government. Looking at Table 3 (Column 10), a 
coefficient of 0.040 (s.e. 0.020) suggests that the arrival of 100 public sector jobs in a postcode 
triggers the creation of about 4 jobs in lobbying organisations within the same area. It also seems 
that the inflow of public sector jobs in an area triggers the creation of about 5-6 jobs in lobbying 
organisations in areas within 1km distance from the boundary of the receiving postcode. 
Nevertheless, these spillovers effects are not statistically significant. These results indicate that 
interest groups tend to locate in relatively close proximity to government institutions. Given the 
aim of lobbying organizations to influence the political process, our findings are as expected.  
                                                     
19
 This classification encompasses activities of business, employers’ and professional organizations; activities of trade 
unions; and activities of other membership organizations.  
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  To summarize, evidence presented so far seems to confirm the validity of our data 
collection exercise. There is good correspondence between the postcodes we have identified 
through independent sources and postcodes that registered a surge in public sector employment 
and lobbying organisations during the government move. In addition, we do not find evidence of 
spillovers in public sector employment. We are thus confident that the data we collected and the 
addresses we attributed to each institution give a realistic description of the spatial distribution of 
the actual employment shock. 
V. Empirical Analysis 
A. Main results 
 Table 4 shows estimation results of Equation (1) for the change in total private sector 
employment between 1998 and 2002. Table 4 is organized in the same way as Table 3, with Column 
(1) reporting the baseline specification and Column (5) a specification with the full set of controls. 
Results indicate that there is a large direct effect, which is about 0.52-0.56 across all specifications. 
That is, the arrival of 100 public sector jobs in an area creates about 52-56 additional jobs in the 
private sector within that area. Looking at the point estimates, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant in Column (1), whereas it gains significance as we include initial postcode 
characteristics in Column (2). This confirms the importance of controlling for initial employment 
size and other pre-treatment characteristics in our estimation. We also find evidence of spillover 
effects. Focusing on the 0-1km coefficient in Column (5), our estimation allows two interpretations. 
First, the inflow of 100 public sector jobs into an area triggers the creation of 36 jobs on average 
in each of the postcodes that are located within the 1km-wide ring surrounding the postcode 
boundary. Thus, we measure spillover effects going from the receiving postcode to neighboring 
areas. Second, the arrival of 100 public sector jobs into an area within the 1km distance ring triggers 
job creation in neighboring postcodes. One of them will be the postcode relative to which we have 
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constructed the ring. In this second interpretation, spillover effects go from the ring to the central 
postcode. Job relocations more than 1km away have no additional effect. 
The policy impact comes entirely through job creation in the service sector. Table 5 shows 
results for the split of total private employment into manufacturing and services.20 Looking at 
Column (1), there is a small negative effect of public employment on manufacturing, but the impact 
turns insignificant when we include initial area controls. Columns (2)-(5) report no significant 
direct or spillover effects apart from a small negative impact in postcodes located on the outskirts 
of the city. Conversely, job changes in services (see Table 5, Columns 6-10) closely mirror those 
reported for total private employment. They are strong in (direct effects) and around (indirect 
effects) the receiving postcodes. 
To understand which service sub-sectors benefit from the relocation of public sector 
employment, the partition is refined in Table 6. For each sub-group, the specification with the full 
set of controls (equivalent to Column 10 in Table 5) is reported. The arrival of public sector workers 
into an area might spur demand for local activities through a multiplier effect, both in terms of 
intermediate demand for consultancy and legal work and/or in terms of consumer demand for 
catering and personal services. We find evidence for both channels: the relocation of public sector 
institutions increases employment in business (including consultancy, legal and professional 
services) and real estate as well as employment in trade and personal services (comprising 
hairdressers, dry cleaners, etc.). The most important channel for the employment multiplier is 
business-to-business activities. Out of the total 56 jobs that are created in the immediate proximity 
to a relocation site (see Table 5, Column 10), 27 jobs are created in the business sector as shown 
                                                     
20
 The manufacturing sector in Berlin was much smaller than services and also relatively declining in the period under 
study. It went from 22.5 percent of the size of the service sector in 1998 to only 20 percent in 2002. 
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in Column (7); 3.2 come from the real estate sector (Column 6); 4.4 through trade (Column 2); and 
1.6 through personal services (Column 9). 
B. Comparison with existing estimates of the agglomeration literature 
Our findings are consistent with those found in the literature. Focusing on short-run effects 
(2003-2008), Faggio (2015) finds that the arrival of 100 public sector workers into a UK Census 
Output area triggers the creation of 55 new jobs in the private sector, with service activities 
benefiting the most from the relocation program. Similar to what we observe here, she also finds 
that the positive impact on services is largely driven by increases in business & real estate as well 
as trade & catering activities. Looking at the impact of public sector expansions in England over 
the period (2003-2007), Faggio and Overman (2014) find no short-term effects of public 
employment on private sector growth in a local labor market. However, they detect a differential 
impact on tradable versus non-tradable activities. Each additional public sector job creates 0.5 jobs 
in the non-tradable sector (construction and services) while crowding out 0.4 jobs in the tradable 
sector (manufacturing). Analyzing the long-run effects of public sector expansions on Spanish city 
growth, Jofre-Monseny et al. (2016) find no impact on tradables, a multiplier effect of 1.1 on non-
tradables and a resulting impact on total employment of 1.3. A multiplier effect of 1.6 was also 
found by Moretti (2010) when exploring the long-run impact of manufacturing employment on 
services across US cities. Moretti (2010) also estimates multipliers of 2 when analyzing the impact 
of skilled manufacturing employment on skilled service jobs.  
Consistent with a growing literature (e.g., Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Andersson et al., 2004, 
2009; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003) documenting the rapid spatial 
decay of agglomeration effects, our results also show that multiplier effects are highly localized: 
they are concentrated within the postcode area receiving the relocated jobs and the 1km-wide buffer 
surrounding the postcode boundary. There are no effects beyond the 1km-wide distance band. In 
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the case of New York City, Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) show that advertising agencies enjoy 
substantial knowledge spillovers from close proximity to other advertising agencies, but such 
effects attenuate sharply beyond a 500 metres straight-line distance. Looking at the case of historic 
Berlin, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) estimate the impact on the productivity of a West Berlin block on 
spillovers from East Berlin, both for the division and reunification experiments. They find evidence 
of substantial production and residential externalities that are highly localized and dissipate rapidly 
with distance. After 10 minutes of travel time (corresponding to about 0.83 kilometers on foot at 
the average speed of 5km per hour), production and residential externalities fall to a value close to 
zero.  
C. Falsification test 
 Berlin has experienced several dramatic changes during the last decades. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent reunification of East- and West-Germany had a strong 
effect on the Berlin economy. The move of the government took place less than 10 years after these 
events during which Berlin went through a phase of economic and social transformation. We 
therefore undertake additional checks to show that the multiplier effect we find is due to the 
relocation of the government and not to the ongoing transformation processes that were triggered 
by the reunification. To rule out the possibility that the effect we find is due to spatially 
differentiated employment growth that happened to coincide with the sites of the government, we 
apply Equation (1) to the time period before the move of the government took place. If reunification 
and the subsequent redevelopment of the central areas close to the Berlin wall were the drivers of 
the employment dynamics we identify in our specification, the effect should already be present in 
the period before the government relocation. In the falsification test we show that this is not the 
case. Ideally we would like to use a time period before the decision of the move of the government 
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was made. However, as shown in Figure 1, this date coincides with the reunification and before 
1991 there are no data available for East-Berlin.21  
 As discussed in the historical section, the timing of the move was very uncertain until the 
very last moment due to the strong opposition against the relocation project by both politicians and 
the general public. It was only in 1997 that a final moving data was announced. We, therefore, use 
the period before the decision on the final moving date for our falsification test, i.e. we use private 
sector employment growth between 1995 and 1997 as the dependent variable in our specification. 
This specification still allows us to control for pre-existing trends in employment change and we 
include 1993-1994 differences as a control. 
 Results for private sector employment, manufacturing and services are shown in Table 7 
(Columns 1-3). We do not find evidence of stronger employment changes in postcodes that were 
to receive public sector institutions in later years. Before the move of the government to Berlin, the 
treatment intensity variables had no effect on changes in the private, manufacturing or service 
sector. As for the main multiplier effect we split the service sector according to different industries 
(see Table 7, Columns 4-7). It is notable that the positive effects on employment changes in 
business, real estate and personal services in the postcodes that would receive the relocated jobs 
are not present in the years prior to the implementation of the program. Overall, the coefficients 
we report in Table 7 are small in size, mostly statistically insignificant and do not seem to follow 
a meaningful pattern (differently from what shown in Tables 4-6). 
  
                                                     
21
 We exclude years 1991 and 1992 from the analysis because of data problems relating to the introduction of the 
employment notification procedure in the federal states of Eastern Germany. 
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D. Distance to the centre 
 An important concern about our analysis is the issue of centrality. After reunification 
several companies opened subsidiaries in Berlin during the 1990s and the 2000s, and within Berlin, 
chose the central locations as their preferred destination area. As documented in Section II and 
Figure 4, the largest employment shock due to the government move also occurred in the postcodes 
located in the centre of Berlin. Because of these parallel developments, our estimates could 
confound the impact of the government move with the expansion of the city centre.  
 To shed some light on these issues, we conduct two robustness checks about the role of 
centrality. First, we replicate our analysis as reported in Tables 4 and 5 substituting our measure of 
distance to the Wall with measures of distance to the CBD of Berlin. We use four different 
definitions of the CBD because Berlin is a polycentric city: (i) distance to the Bundestag, which is 
the new political centre; (ii) distance to Alexanderplatz, the main centre of the former East; (iii) 
distance to Postdamer Platz, a newly emerged commercial centre; and (iv) distance to Kudamm, 
the main centre of the former West. When analyzing the impact of Berlin’s division (and 
reunification) on house price gradients in Western blocks, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) point out that it is 
not proximity to the Berlin Wall per se that matters, but the loss of access (and regained access) to 
the pre-war CBD. In fact, they find little evidence of a negative treatment effect of division along 
segments of the Berlin Wall far from the pre-war CBD. In our case, the adoption of different 
measures of distance to the CBD does not alter our main results (see Table 8). The impact of public 
employment remains large, positive and statistically significant for total private sector employment 
and services in areas receiving and in close proximity to a relocation site. There is essentially no 
impact on manufacturing employment. In addition, none of the distance-to-the-centre dummies 
enters the estimation significantly, as was the case with the distance-to-the-Wall dummy.  
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 Second, we quantify the importance of centrality over time by regressing 5-year growth 
rates (1992-1997; 1997-2002; 2002-2007) in total private sector employment on one of our 
distance-to-the-centre measures, i.e. distance to the Bundestag.22 A negative correlation between 
employment growth and distance to the CBD would indicate that employment growth is higher in 
postcodes closer to the city centre than in periphery areas. A stronger (weaker) correlation for later 
rather than earlier periods would suggest that the importance of Berlin city-centre increases 
(decreases) over time. Looking at Table 9, results show that there is indeed a negative correlation 
between private employment and distance to the CBD confirming the presumption that, during the 
15-year period considered, economic activity has expanded at higher rates in central postcodes than 
peripheral areas. Furthermore, results show that the importance of centrality for private job 
expansion decreases over time. Looking at the weighted regression with initial controls (Table 9, 
Column 6), the coefficient is largest and statistically significant (coeff. -0.016; s.e. 0.005) in the 
initial period (1992-1997), shrinks by about 40% in the middle period (1997-2002) and becomes 
12.5% of what it was initially (turning statistically insignificant) in the later period (2002-2007).  
 Taken together, the robustness checks presented in this section indicate that the risk that 
our estimates could confound the impact of the government move on private activity with the 
expansion of the Berlin city-centre is low. Measures of the distance to the CBD do not affect our 
analysis. Moreover, the importance of centrality in explaining the city expansion decreases over 
time, being indeed weaker during the government relocation program. 
E. Further robustness checks and extensions 
 As mentioned in the data section, another concern that might impact our findings is that we 
attribute addresses of multi-site firms to the address of the headquarters. There might be a tendency 
                                                     
22
 Results (available upon request) do not change if other distance-to-the-centre measures are used. 
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that this address is in the centre of Berlin, where the public employment shock is largest. As a 
result, private sector employment changes in proximity to public sector buildings might seem larger 
than they actually are, given that the true change is spread across multiple sites. In order to isolate 
the impact of larger firms from smaller ones, we replicate our analysis restricting our sample to 
private sector firms with either less than 250 employees or less than 50 employees in 1998. 
Qualitatively, the main results still hold (see Table 10), but effects are smaller in size, particularly 
for the sample of firms with less than 50 employees. We find that the arrival of 100 public sector 
jobs into a postcode area in Berlin spurs the creation of 16 additional jobs in small (<50 workers) 
service firms located within the same area. When using both large and small firms, the impact was 
56 new jobs (see Table 5, Column 10). The public job inflow also spurs the creation of 4 new jobs 
among small (<50 workers) service firms in areas in close proximity to a relocation site (see Table 
10, Column 6). The corresponding effect for the whole sample was 34 jobs. As multi-side firms 
are most likely to have a high number of employees (e.g., the total number of employees working 
for a supermarket chain), the possibility of attributing all employment to centrally located head 
offices does not seem to be driving our findings. 
A second robustness check consists in comparing short- and long-run effects (see Table 
11). It is noteworthy that the impact of public employment on private activity consistently increases 
over time. Focusing on the short-term, we regress (1998-2000) changes in private employment on 
the spatial distribution of job moves occurring in 1999 only. We find large and statistically 
significant direct effects, but no statistically significant spillovers effects. As we move from the 
short- to the long-term (1998-2005) so that more cumulative relocations (those occurring between 
1998 and 2004) can be included in our set of treatment intensity variables, we find larger direct and 
indirect effects (both statistically significant). It is interesting to note that effects are also larger 
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than the ones reported in our preferred specification, i.e. (1998-2002) changes as reported in Tables 
4 and 5.  
As an additional robustness check we assess the role of the bandwidth for our results. A 
priori we do not know the geographical spread of the policy. Using different bandwidth we can 
check at which distance the policy effect attenuates. Consistent with an emerging literature on the 
spatial range of agglomeration effects, we also find that effects are highly localized. They occur in 
and around the receiving postcodes. There are no spillovers beyond the 1km ring. In this exercise, 
we want to enlarge the width of the first ring from 1km to 1.5km, and then to 2km. In doing so, the 
average number of postcodes included in the first ring expands, as postcodes at an increasing 
distance to a relocation site and, thus, potentially less affected by the government move will be 
included. As the first ring expands, we expect to estimate a decreasing spillover effect for the 
average postcode included in the now larger first ring. Results confirm these expectations (see 
Table 12). The drop is largest when we expand the first ring from 0-1km to 0-1.5km: the 
corresponding estimated coefficients are 0.333 (s.e. 0.104) and 0.136 (s.e. 0.081), respectively. As 
we further expand the ring to cover 0-2km, the estimated coefficient decreases to 0.120 (s.e. 0.068). 
 As an alternative to treatment intensity variables, we also experiment with parametric 
weighting functions, which allocate a weight based on the inverse distance measured from each 
postcode centroid to the centroid of the areas that received relocated jobs. We thus replace our 
treatment intensity variables in Equation (1) with a parametric weighting function defined either as ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଵ or ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଶ. In formulas: 
  ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଵ = ∑ ଵ|ௗ௜௦௧೔ೕ|+ଵ × ∆݁݉�௝௥௘�௢௖ଵ88௜=ଵ  (2) 
  ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଶ = ∑ ଵ(|ௗ௜௦௧೔ೕ|+ଵ)2 × ∆݁݉�௝௥௘�௢௖ଵ88௜=ଵ  (3) 
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Results for total private sector employment and the industry split are presented in Table 13. For 
each subsample, we contrast the effects estimated using both ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଵ and ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଶ on 
contemporaneous (1998-2002) and pre-treatment (1995-1997) changes in private sector 
employment. Estimates seem to confirm the results obtained so far. The same industries that react 
to public sector relocations using the non-parametric specification show significant employment 
growth when using distance weighting functions. For each 100 public sector employees weighted 
by the inverse of the absolute distance to the postcode, private sector employment increases by 32 
workers. The corresponding effect is 52 workers if the weight is chosen as the inverse of the 
absolute distance squared. Similarly to what was found before, significant effects are obtained for 
real estate, business and professional services, and personal services. Using weighting functions, 
we also find a significant effect on finance whereas we fail to replicate the effect for trade. Looking 
at pre-treatment employment changes, i.e. a falsification test, all significant effects disappear. 
VI. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have shown that policies concerning public sector employment cannot be 
thought of as independent from their potential impact on the private sector. Using the move of the 
German government from Bonn to Berlin as a natural experiment, we found a significant positive 
effect of public employment on private sector activity for relocations occurring within the same 
postcode. The arrival of 100 public sector workers into a postcode area results in an employment 
gain of about 56 private sector jobs. We also found evidence of spatial spillovers. The inflow of 
public sector workers into an area add on average another 36 jobs in areas neighboring the 
relocation site. These effects comes through job creation in the service sector with the largest job 
gains in professional services such as legal activities and consultancies. Equally, employment in 
personal services (e.g., hairdressers, beauty salons and dry cleaners) increases indicating a higher 
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demand for locally-produced goods and services. For manufacturing jobs, we found neither 
evidence of a multiplier nor of a crowding-out effect.   
 Our findings are robust to a series of checks and extensions. Most importantly, we found 
no effect on private sector employment during the years leading up to the relocation program. We 
verified that the multiplier effect we obtain is indeed due to the relocation program and not to other 
transformation processes that were triggered by the reunification of West- and East-Germany. We 
ruled out the possibility that our estimates are driven by the expansion of Berlin CBD.   
 Our study has limitations. Since our methodology does not allow us to derive general 
equilibrium effects of the government move, we cannot infer how much higher overall employment 
in Berlin actually is compared to a scenario without the relocation. Additionally, the employment 
multipliers we identified in the analysis necessarily ignore one important aspect of the relocation 
program: in which parts of Berlin the incoming government employees choose to reside. Since we 
do not have information on residential choices, we cannot study localized effects on the housing 
market or changes in consumption patterns.  
 Summing up, we found that a large relocation program of government offices in Germany 
had a decisive impact on local private employment. In line with the literature on external economies 
of agglomeration, we also found that employment effects are highly localized and sharply attenuate 
with distance. These findings suggest that job relocation programs can be used as a tool for local 
economic development to create employment opportunities in targeted areas. Unlikely, the policy 
would spread beyond the areas of interest. Though we focus on an overall positive employment 
shock, it seems likely that public sector job cuts generate comparable (negative) local multiplier 
effects. This possibility should be taken into account in policy decision making and, in contesting 
cases, compensatory measures could be considered. Our results suggest that such compensations, 
if implemented, might have to be precisely targeted to actually help the disadvantaged area.  
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Figure 1: Timeline of the decision making process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, 1991a, 1991b and 2010 
 
 
Figure 2: Historic setting 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Left Picture: Period of division lasting from 1949 to 1990. Right Picture: Implementation of the move of 
the government from Bonn to Berlin in 1999. 
Sources: See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
  
1991: The Bundestag decides to move the 
seat of the government from Bonn to 
Berlin with 338 against 320 votes 
 
1997: The Bundestag decides 
about the final moving date which 
is to take place in summer 1999 
2001: The majority of 
planned relocations has 
been realized 
1990:
   
Berlin becomes capital of  
reunified Germany 
1994: The Bonn/Berlin Act 
provides statutory security 
about the move of the seat 
of the government to Berlin 
1999: The government takes 
up its work in Berlin 
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Figure 3: Timing of the relocation program 
Note: Panel A shows embassy jobs that moved into Berlin; Panel B shows jobs in federal institutions that moved 
out of Berlin; Panel C shows government-related jobs that moved into Berlin; Panel D shows net changes in total 
jobs. 
Sources: See Table A.2 for details. 
 
  
 40 
 
Figure 4: Spatial distribution of the relocation program by postcode  
Sources: See Table A.2 for details. 
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Table 1: Number of relocated jobs  
 Institutions Number of jobs moved 
POSITIONS MOVED FROM BONN TO BERLIN  
 Ministries 9,075 
 Bundestag, -rat,-präsidialamt 5,276 
 Länder representations 626 
 GOVERNMENT RELATED JOBS 14,977 
 Foreign representations 6,300 
 Media, parties and interest groups 3,7001 
 FOREIGN AND MEDIA RELATED JOBS 10,000 
POSITIONS MOVED FROM BERLIN TO BONN  
 Federal and other institutions -4,054 
POSITIONS MOVED FROM BERLIN TO THE NEW LÄNDER  
 Federal institutions -2,9272 
 POSITIONS MOVED OUT OF BERLIN -6,981 
TOTAL  24,977 - 6,981 = 17,9963 
Notes: 1According to the Deutscher Bundestag (1992), 10,000 jobs in foreign representations, media companies, 
political parties and interest groups would move from Bonn to Berlin in the aftermath of the relocation.  
2 As a federal country, Germany needs to balance the distribution of federal institutions across all federal states. The 
initial program involved the move of 4,700 jobs out of Berlin to the New Federal States (New Länder), but some 
reallocations never materialized.  
3 The DIW estimated a net gain of 18,159 job positions for the city of Berlin (see Geppert and Vesper, 2006) whereas 
the Prognos AG (2003) estimated a net gain of 14,500 positions. Our estimate is in between. 
Sources: See Table A.2 for details. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for receiving and non-receiving postcodes 
 Postcodes not receiving 
jobs 
Postcodes receiving jobs  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference in 
means 
log total employment 7.46 0.823 8.12 0.874 -0.654*** 
% full time employment 77.9% 0.081 74.8% 0.086 3.1%** 
% female employment 46.0% 0.130 53.7% 0.080 -7.6%*** 
% low qualified employment 13.0% 0.063 11.5% 0.052 1.5% 
% medium qualified 
employment 53.7% 0.095 53.6% 0.086 0.1% 
% high qualified 
employment 9.1% 0.060 13.5% 0.093 -4.4%*** 
% other qualified 
employment 24.1% 0.107 21.6% 0.104 2.5% 
% workers in unskilled occ. 33.6% 0.094 28.9% 0.096 4.7% 
% workers in skilled occ. 42.7% 0.087 42.4% 0.125 0.2% 
% technicians 5.0% 0.031 4.3% 0.028 0.7% 
% semi-professionals 9.1% 0.095 11.7% 0.110 -2.6% 
% engineers 3.4% 0.038 3.6% 0.040 -0.2% 
% professionals 1.5% 0.016 3.9% 0.064 -2.4%*** 
% managers 3.3% 0.021 3.8% 0.022 -0.5% 
% employees aged 16 - 24 11.6% 0.048 10.6% 0.033 1.0% 
% employees aged 25 - 39 42.5% 0.045 42.9% 0.039 -0.5% 
% employees aged 40 - 54 33.9% 0.040 34.4% 0.038 -0.5% 
% employees aged 55 - 65 11.9% 0.028 12.2% 0.028 -0.3% 
Observations 150  38   
Note: All figures refer to 1998. There are 188 Berlin postcodes, with 30 postcodes receiving a positive and 8 
postcodes receiving a negative public sector employment shock. 150 postcodes did not receive (or lost) any relocated 
job. 
Sources: Establishment History Panel 1975-2010 (weakly anonymous) with added postcodes for Berlin. 
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Table 3: Plausibility check - the impact of 1999-2001 cumulative relocations on (1998-2002) changes in public sector and special interest group 
employment 
 Public sector employment (SIC75 and SIC99) Special interest group employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Receiving areas 
     
   
 
0km 0.673*** 0.753*** 0.819*** 0.805*** 0.802*** 0.043* 0.044** 0.045** 0.042** 0.040* 
 [0.077] [0.054] [0.062] [0.061] [0.068] [0.023] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] 
Spillovers 
      
    
0-1km 0.001 -0.009 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 0.048 0.055 0.056 0.057 0.056 
 [0.051] [0.045] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] 
0-2km 
-0.056 -0.016 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.006 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.053] [0.048] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
0-3km 0.062 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.053] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
0-4km 
-0.028 -0.021 -0.03 -0.03 -0.0301 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.068] [0.048] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
0-5km -0.007 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.033] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
0-15km 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.006] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.017] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Area controls 
 
√ √ √ √ 
 
√ √ √ √ 
Pre-trends 
 
 √ √ √ 
 
 √ √ √ 
Distance to the Wall 
   √ √    √ √ 
Dummy for West Berlin 
    √     √ 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Columns (2) and (7) 
include initial (1998) postcode level controls, i.e. log of total employment, shares of female and part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures. 
Columns (3) and (8) include area controls and pre-trends. Pre-trends are defined as the (1995-1997) changes in public sector employment (in Column 3) and special 
interest group employment (in Column 8). Columns (4) and (9) include a variable measuring the closest distance from the postcode centroid to the Berlin Wall. 
Columns (5) and (10) also include a location dummy for West Berlin. Special interest group employment is identified as employment recorded in codes 870, 871, 
872 and 881 of the 1973 standard industry code (SIC) classification (3-digit). Public sector employment is identified as employment recorded in codes 75 and 99 
of the 1993 SIC classification (2-digit). 
Sources: Establishment History Panel 1975-2010 (weakly anonymous) with added postcodes for Berlin; government relocation data collected through independent 
sources (see Table A.2). 
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Table 4: The impact of (1999-2001) cumulative relocations on (1998-2002) changes in private sector 
employment 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Receiving areas      
0km 0.519 0.558** 0.555* 0.545* 0.547* 
 [0.331] [0.281] [0.283] [0.283] [0.284] 
Spillovers      
0-1 km 0.386*** 0.352*** 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.357*** 
 [0.115] [0.121] [0.121] [0.122] [0.122] 
0-2 km -0.025 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 
 [0.045] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] 
0-3 km -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
 [0.043] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] 
0-4 km 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 [0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
0-5 km -0.008 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
0-15 km -0.010 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.007] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] 
Area controls  √ √ √ √ 
Pre trends   √ √ √ 
Distance to the wall    √ √ 
Dummy for West Berlin     √ 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Columns (2) includes initial (1998) postcode level controls, i.e. log of total employment, shares of 
female and part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures. Columns (3) includes area controls and pre-
trends, which are defined as (1995-1997) changes in private sector employment. Columns (4) includes a variable 
measuring the closest distance from the postcode centroid to the Berlin Wall. Columns (5) includes a West Berlin 
dummy. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 5: The impact of (1999-2001) cumulative relocations on (1998-2002) changes in manufacturing and service employment 
 Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Receiving areas           
0 km -0.013*** -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 0.535 0.559** 0.556** 0.554** 0.559** 
 [0.005] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015] [0.326] [0.264] [0.266] [0.266] [0.266] 
Spillovers           
0-1 km 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.369*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 0.341*** 0.343*** 
 [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.117] [0.126] [0.127] [0.127] [0.127] 
0-2 km -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.044] [0.041] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] 
0-3 km 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.025 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.041] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
0-4 km -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.019 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.028] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
0-5 km 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] 
0-15 km -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] 
Area controls  √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ 
Pre-trends   √ √ √   √ √ √ 
Distance to the 
wall 
   √ √    √ √ 
Dummy for West 
Berlin 
    √     √ 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Columns are organized 
as in Table 4. Pre-trends are defined as the (1995-1997) changes in manufacturing employment (in Column 3) and service employment (in Column 8).  
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 6: Splitting services by sub-group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Transport Trade Hotels Restaurants Finance Real Estate Business Media Personal 
Services 
Tourism 
Receiving areas           
0 km 0.076 0.044* -0.003 0.005 0.039 0.032*** 0.268* 0.079 0.016*** 0.020 
 [0.051] [0.024] [0.004] [0.017] [0.044] [0.011] [0.153] [0.051] [0.005] [0.022] 
Spillovers           
0-1 km 0.091 0.002 0.014* 0.007 0.118 -0.002 0.089 -0.000 0.007*** 0.017 
 [0.088] [0.014] [0.008] [0.009] [0.088] [0.009] [0.065] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] 
0-2 km 0.010 -0.012 -0.004 -0.017 -0.009 0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.003 -0.022** 
 [0.021] [0.010] [0.002] [0.013] [0.018] [0.011] [0.019] [0.01] [0.003] [0.010] 
0-3 km -0.021 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.015 -0.008 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 0.010 
 [0.019] [0.008] [0.002] [0.006] [0.012] [0.005] [0.014] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] 
0-4 km 0.018 0.008 -0.000 0.003 -0.020* 0.008* -0.016 -0.002 0.001 -0.00 
 [0.013] [0.008] [0.002] [0.005] [0.011] [0.004] [0.013] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] 
0-5 km -0.010 -0.012 0.000 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
0-15 km 0.013 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All columns include 
initial (1998) postcode level controls, pre-trends, the distance to the Berlin Wall and a West Berlin dummy. Pre-trends are defined as the (1995-1997) changes in 
each sub-group own employment. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 7: Falsification test – the impact of (1999-2001) cumulative relocations on (1995-1997) changes in 
total private sector, manufacturing and service (including selected sub-groups) employment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Private Manufacturing Services Trade Real 
Estate 
Business Personal 
Services 
Receiving areas        
0 km -0.023 0.007 0.018 -0.008 0.013 0.019 0.001 
 [0.042] [0.012] [0.033] [0.014] [0.012] [0.013] [0.002] 
Spillovers        
0-1 km 0.044 -0.001 0.033 0.011* 0.004 0.012 0.000 
 [0.040] [0.006] [0.035] [0.006] [0.006] [0.016] [0.001] 
0-2 km 0.007 0.006 0.023 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 [0.036] [0.005] [0.031] [0.005] [0.004] [0.012] [0.001] 
0-3 km -0.004 0.000 -0.011 -0.004 -0.003 0.011 0.001 
 [0.025] [0.006] [0.026] [0.005] [0.003] [0.012] [0.002] 
0-4 km -0.028 -0.004 -0.026 0.008 -0.001 -0.025* 0.000 
 [0.020] [0.007] [0.022] [0.010] [0.003] [0.013] [0.001] 
0-5 km 0.012 0.004 0.011 -0.006 0.002 0.015* 0.000 
 [0.013] [0.005] [0.015] [0.009] [0.002] [0.008] [0.001] 
0-15 km 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.010] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. All columns include initial (1995) postcode level controls, pre-trends, the distance of each postcode 
centroid to the Berlin Wall and a West Berlin dummy. Pre-trends are defined as the (1993-1994) changes in total 
private (Column 1), manufacturing (Column 2) and services (Column 3) employment. Among sub-groups in services, 
pre-trends are defined as the (1993-1994) changes in trade (Column 4), real estate (Column 5), business (Column 6) 
and personal services (Column 7) employment. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 8: The impact of different distance measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Private Manuf Services Private Manf Services Private Manuf Services Private Manuf Services 
Receiving areas             
0 km 0.598** -0.014 0.594** 0.622** -0.006 0.612** 0.579** -0.017 0.579** 0.543* -0.015 0.553** 
 [0.284] [0.020] [0.268] [0.281] [0.021] [0.264] [0.283] [0.019] [0.267] [0.288] [0.014] [0.272] 
Spillovers             
0-1 km 0.354*** 0.007 0.341*** 0.350*** 0.006 0.337** 0.355*** 0.007 0.342*** 0.357*** 0.007 0.343*** 
 [0.124] [0.006] [0.129] [0.126] [0.006] [0.131] [0.123] [0.006] [0.129] [0.121] [0.006] [0.126] 
0-2 km -0.019 0.002 -0.008 -0.016 0.002 -0.005 -0.020 0.001 -0.008 -0.021 0.002 -0.010 
 [0.041] [0.005] [0.043] [0.041] [0.005] [0.043] [0.041] [0.005] [0.043] [0.040] [0.005] [0.042] 
0-3 km -0.008 0.003 -0.022 -0.010 0.004 -0.023 -0.008 0.003 -0.022 -0.009 0.003 -0.023 
 [0.036] [0.006] [0.035] [0.036] [0.006] [0.035] [0.036] [0.006] [0.035] [0.036] [0.006] [0.035] 
0-4 km 0.005 -0.005 0.008 0.005 -0.005 0.009 0.005 -0.005 0.009 0.007 -0.004 0.010 
 [0.034] [0.006] [0.029] [0.033] [0.006] [0.029] [0.033] [0.006] [0.029] [0.034] [0.006] [0.030] 
0-5 km -0.008 0.001 -0.009 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 -0.018 0.000 -0.017 
 [0.026] [0.005] [0.023] [0.024] [0.004] [0.021] [0.027] [0.004] [0.024] [0.028] [0.004] [0.026] 
0-15 km 0.009 -0.009** 0.013 0.016 -0.007 0.018 0.005 -0.010** 0.009 -0.004 -0.009*** 0.003 
 [0.021] [0.004] [0.020] [0.021] [0.005] [0.019] [0.020] [0.004] [0.019] [0.018] [0.003] [0.017] 
             
Distance to 
Bundestag 
12.42 
[22.55] 
-3.186 
[5.214] 
10.79 
[21.00] 
         
Distance to 
Alexanderplatz 
   21.24 
[20.16] 
-0.911 
[5.495] 
17.45 
[18.90] 
      
Distance to 
Potsdamer Platz 
      7.137 
[21.37] 
-4.397 
[4.984] 
6.706 
[20.65] 
   
Distance to  
Kudamm 
         -5.805 
[21.48] 
-4.799 
[4.157] 
-2.418 
[19.95] 
Obs 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All columns include initial area 
controls, pre-trends and a West Berlin dummy. The variable distance to the Wall is replaced by distance to the Bundestag (Columns 1-3), distance to Alexanderplatz 
(Columns 4-6), distance to Potsdamer Platz (Columns 7-9) and distance to Kudamm (Columns 10-12). 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 9: Centrality test – the impact of distance to the CBD on 5-year growth in private sector employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
       
distance to the CBD -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
    
(1992-1997) × distance to the CBD   -0.006* 
[0.004] 
-0.018*** 
[0.005] 
-0.013 
[0.005] 
-0.016*** 
[0.005] 
(1997-2002) × distance to the CBD   -0.002 
[0.004] 
-0.008 
[0.005] 
-0.010** 
[0.005] 
-0.010* 
[0.005] 
(2002-2007) × distance to the CBD   -0.000 
[0.004] 
-0.002 
[0.006] 
-0.003 
[0.005] 
-0.002 
[0.005] 
Controls     √ √ 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable 
refers to 5-year growth rates (1992-1997; 1997-2002: 2002-2007) in total private employment for each of the 188 postcodes. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), regressions 
are weighted by postcode size. Columns (5) and (6) include initial (1992) postcode controls. 
Source: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 10: The impact of public employment on SME private sector enterprises 
 Sample with employment < 250 Sample with employment < 50 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Private Manufacturing Services Private Manufacturing Services 
Receiving 
areas 
      
0 km 0.286* -0.001 0.290* 0.157* -0.001 0.159* 
 [0.163] [0.003] [0.152] [0.090] [0.001] [0.087] 
Spillovers       
0-1 km 0.075* 0.000 0.070 0.041** -0.000 0.038* 
 [0.042] [0.001] [0.046] [0.019] [0.001] [0.021] 
0-2 km -0.011 -0.000 -0.008 0.003 -0.001 0.006 
 [0.020] [0.001] [0.018] [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] 
0-3 km 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 [0.014] [0.002] [0.012] [0.007] [0.001] [0.006] 
0-4 km -0.003 0.001 -0.010 0.007 -0.000 0.008 
 [0.015] [0.002] [0.016] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] 
0-5 km 0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.005] [0.001] [0.004] 
0-15 km -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 [0.007] [0.001] [0.005] [0.003] [0.000] [0.003] 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(3) is defined as the (1998-2002) changes in private sector 
employment where employment is computed restricting the sample to firms with less than 250 employees in 1998. 
Correspondently, the dependent variable in Columns (4)-(6) is defined as the (1998-2002) changes in private sector 
employment where employment is computed restricting the sample to firms with less than 50 employees in 1998. All 
columns include initial (1998) postcode level controls, pre-trends, the distance of each postcode centroid to the Berlin 
Wall and a West Berlin dummy. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 11: The impact of public employment on private employment: short-and long-run effects 
 (1998-2000) changes (1998-2005) changes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Private Manufacturing Services Private Manufacturing Services 
Receiving areas       
0 km 0.422** -0.001 0.420** 0.650* -0.010 0.629* 
 [0.203] [0.016] [0.191] [0.390] [0.023] [0.360] 
Spillovers       
0-1 km 0.264 0.006 0.252 0.392** 0.013 0.348* 
 [0.191] [0.008] [0.191] [0.194] [0.010] [0.204] 
0-2 km -0.006 0.005 -0.008 0.008 -0.006 0.037 
 [0.066] [0.005] [0.064] [0.057] [0.009] [0.062] 
0-3 km -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 0.013 -0.031 
 [0.035] [0.005] [0.033] [0.047] [0.009] [0.049] 
0-4 km 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.027 -0.005 0.018 
 [0.031] [0.006] [0.026] [0.050] [0.015] [0.043] 
0-5 km -0.010 0.001 -0.011 -0.062* -0.001 -0.054* 
 [0.023] [0.004] [0.019] [0.036] [0.012] [0.030] 
0-15 km 0.000 -0.006* 0.002 -0.013 -0.010*** -0.006 
 [0.013] [0.003] [0.011] [0.022] [0.003] [0.020] 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. The dependent variables is defined as the (1998-2000), (1998-2005), and (1998-2008) 
changes in private sector employment in Columns (1)-(3), (4)-(6), and (7-9), respectively. The treatment intensity 
variables are computed using relocated jobs between 1999 and 2001 in Columns (1)-(3); they are computed using 
relocated jobs between 1999 and 2004 in Columns (4)-(9). All columns include initial (1998) postcode level controls, 
(1995-1997) pre-trends, the minimum distance to the Berlin Wall and a West Berlin dummy. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 12: Enlarging the first distance band 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Receiving areas    
0 km 0.546* 0.553* 0.554* 
 [0.283] [0.288] [0.286] 
Spillovers    
0-1 km 0.333***   
 [0.109]   
0-1.5 km  0.136*  
  [0.081]  
0-2 km   0.120* 
   [0.068] 
0-3 km -0.014 -0.007 -0.027 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.029] 
0-5 km -0.012 -0.016 -0.015 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] 
0-15 km -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.015] 
Observations 188 188 188 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. In all columns, the dependent variable is defined as the (1998-2000) changes in private sector 
employment. All columns include initial (1998) postcode level controls, (1995-1997) pre-trends, the minimum distance 
to the Berlin Wall and a West Berlin dummy. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Table 13: Using distance weighting functions 
 Private Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) 
Fct 1 0.316** -0.031 0.012 0.010 0.308** -0.018 
 [0.157] [0.033] [0.010] [0.007] [0.150] [0.031] 
Fct 2 0.517** -0.032 0.015 0.009 0.505** -0.008 
 [0.226] [0.036] [0.010] [0.008] [0.213] [0.032] 
 Trade Hotel Cafes 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) 
Fct 1 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.007 
 [0.019] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.013] [0.005] 
Fct 2 0.031 -0.004 0.003 0.015 -0.001 0.012 
 [0.023] [0.010] [0.005] [0.009] [0.016] [0.008] 
 Finance Real Estate Business 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) 
Fct 1 0.053* -0.014 0.018* 0.002 0.144* 0.005 
 [0.028] [0.011] [0.009] [0.006] [0.081] [0.010] 
Fct 2 0.070** -0.024 0.024** 0.007 0.242** 0.009 
 [0.029] [0.018] [0.010] [0.009] [0.121] [0.013] 
 Media Personal services Tourism 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) Δ(1998-2002) Δ(1995-1997) 
Fct 1 0.041 -0.001 0.007** 0.000 0.009 0.008 
 [0.027] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.015] [0.009] 
Fct 2 0.067 0.000 0.008** 0.000 0.017 0.015 
 [0.041] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.020] [0.014] 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Industry (sub-)sectors 
are indicated at the top of each panel. Dependent variables correspond to either the (1998-2002) or the (1995-1997) changes in employment for a given (sub-)sector. 
In all panels, estimates refer to coefficients of two distance weighting functions: Function 1: ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଵ = ∑ ଵ|ௗ௜௦௧೔ೕ|+ଵ × ∆݁݉�௝௥௘�௢௖ଵ88௜=ଵ and Function 2: ݐ�݁ܽݐ௣ଶ =∑ ଵ(|ௗ௜௦௧೔ೕ|+ଵ)2 × ∆݁݉�௝௥௘�௢௖ଵ88௜=ଵ . ∆݁݉�௝௥௘�௢௖ refers to (1999-2001) public sector relocations. As explained in the text, these replace treatment intensity variables in 
specification similar to Equation (1). Columns referring to (1998-2002) changes include initial (1998) postcode level controls, (1995-1997) pre-trends, the minimum 
distance to the Berlin Wall and a West Berlin dummy. Columns referring to (1995-1997) changes include initial (1995) postcode level controls, (1993-1994) pre-
trends, the minimum distance to the Berlin Wall and a West Berlin dummy. 
Sources: see Table 3 for details. 
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Web Appendices 
A.1. Historical setting – details 
When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
were founded in 1949, it was unclear how long this separation would last. Berlin, German capital 
between 1871 and 1945, was claimed to be part of both states. In the constitution of the GDR, Berlin 
was declared its capital whereas, in the basic law of the FRG, (Great-) Berlin was considered as the 
11th federal state. As a result, the city was divided into East-Berlin – the sector governed by the USSR 
– and West-Berlin – made up of the three sectors governed by the US, France and the UK. Overall, 
the city geographically fell unto the Soviet occupation zone. 
The two German states did not recognize each other’s sovereignty straight away. The FRG 
saw the division as a temporary state and both the political decision makers as well as the general 
public advocated a reunified Germany with Berlin as its capital (Süß, 1999). That the situation was 
widely seen a transitional was also reflected in the discussion about the seat of the FRG government. 
The new capital should have a provisional character and be only of medium power (Dreher, 1979) 
not to hamper the move of the government back to Berlin once the two German states reunified. 
The perception that the division would only be of short duration changed when in August 
1961 construction works of the Berlin Wall began. In December 1972, the FRG and the GDR came 
to terms with the status quo and mutually recognized each other as sovereign states by signing the 
Basic Treaty. Shortly before, the allies had resolved their dispute on their rights and responsibilities 
in Berlin in the Quadripartite Agreement. Berlin would continue not to be a constituent part of the 
FRG.23 In his government declaration in 1973 Willy Brandt referred for the first time to Bonn as the 
                                                     
23
 This rule was frequently a source of conflict between the FRG and the GDR, if for example federal offices of the FRG 
were established in West-Berlin. 
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federal capital of Germany. Though the ultimate aim of the West German government was still 
reunification, the political discussion about Berlin as capital was muted substantially. 
Reunification and the Bonn/Berlin question 
Political protest against the East German government began in September 1989 with the so 
called Monday-demonstrations in Leipzig. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 it was 
once again possible to freely move within the Eastern and Western parts of the city. Berlin became 
capital of United Germany in 1990 when the Unification Treaty (1990) was signed between the newly 
elected government of the GDR and FRG. However, the decision on the seat of the government was 
postponed until after the election of the first assembly (Bundestag) of reunified Germany. 
The crucial debate about the move of the government to Berlin took place on June 20th, 1991. 
The assembly was divided. The deputies of the ten western federal states had already shown their 
preference for Bonn during the negotiation of the Reunification Treaty (Süß, 1999). Polls among the 
total of 662 members of parliament saw Bonn as the clear favorite (Tschirch, 1999). Bonn advocates 
pointed towards the successful democratic as well as the federalist tradition. European integration 
had been facilitated by Bonn’s proximity to the western allies and the EU seat in Brussels. Integration 
would slow down if Berlin became the new capital (Salz, 2006). Additionally, large infrastructure 
investments had turned Bonn into a highly efficient administration. These investments would be lost 
and the means for setting up the government in Berlin would be better spend on construction projects 
in the new federal states (Tschirch, 1999). 
The main argument of the pro-Berlin faction was that of credibility. Since 1949 when the FRG 
was founded politicians had repeated again and again that Berlin was the actual capital of Germany. 
Bonn had become capital with a provisional mandate which would move back to Berlin once East 
and West Germany were united. Further important arguments were the importance of the move as a 
sign of solidarity between the old and the new federal states and Berlin’s potential as a bridge of 
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Eastern Europe. Economically the move of the government was expected to strengthen the weak local 
economic position of Berlin and the economically underdeveloped east. The city of Bonn on the other 
hand feared that “the small Bonn” would lose its political significance as well as economic power 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1991b, p. 2736-2738). 
The most important arguments in the discussion were linked to rather abstract concepts. 
Credibility and the future of the reunited Germany stood out for the pro-Berlin side whereas Bonn 
was seen as a symbol of successful democratic tradition (Tschirch, 1999). In the final ballot the 
assembly decided to move the seat of the government from Bonn to Berlin with 338 against 320 votes 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1991b). The feeble majority could only be reached by making large 
concessions to the city of Bonn. A fair division of labor between Berlin and Bonn should be 
negotiated where core government functions should take their seat in Berlin but the majority of 
government jobs should remain in Bonn. Bonn should receive financial compensation as well as new 
functions and institutions of national and international significance. A commission should be 
appointed to work on proposals for the distribution of national and international agencies across the 
new federal states, as the constitution of Germany states that each federal state should have some 
national power. The national parliament (Bundestag) was supposed to take up its function in Berlin 
within 4 years. Within 10-12 years all government functions should be located in Berlin (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1991a). The Federal Assembly decided two weeks later with 38 against 30 votes to remain 
in Bonn (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010). 
Realization of the move 
The decision made in 1991 left the details of the move open. While working on a practical 
concept it became clear by 1991 that a move within four years was unfeasible. What followed was a 
long discussion about the timing of the move and its costs. One motion proposed to stop any further 
government related investments in Berlin until the financial situation of the FRG had improved. 
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Another proposed to postpone the move until 2010. Furthermore, a mass petition was organized to 
suspend a decision about the date of the move until the government had full knowledge of the costs 
and the financial situation of the state had improved (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010). This dispute 
created uncertainty among the private companies that had started to invest in Berlin. In November 
1993, 40 national and international companies pointed at the breach of trust should the government 
cease its effort to press ahead with the move (Hoffman 1998, p. 213). 
The uncertainty about the move diminished in 1994 when the Berlin/Bonn Act (1994) passed 
in March 1994. Though it did not specify a concrete moving date, the act provided statutory security 
that the move was to take place. It also detailed the implementation of the move such a definition of 
a fair division of labor between Berlin and Bonn and concrete compensatory measures for Bonn. Six 
ministries should keep their first seat in Bonn and get a second seat in Berlin; nine ministries should 
take their first seat in Berlin and keep their second seat in Bonn. Additionally, it was decided that the 
majority of ministerial positions should remain in Bonn. The following years were mostly concerned 
with the practical implementation of the move. Construction of the new buildings (Jakob-Kaiser-
Haus, Paul-Löbe-Haus) began in spring 1997 but it was only by November 1997 that the Federal 
Parliament announced a moving date. The government was to take up its work in Berlin in September 
1999. Until then the timing had remained heavily debated. Parliament and government officially 
started their work in Berlin in September 1999. The majority of employees moved in 1999 and 2000 
so that by the end of 2000 more than 8,000 ministerial employees were located in Berlin. In the 
subsequent years more jobs were gradually moved from Bonn to Berlin. In 2010, about 10,000 
positions were established in Berlin. Since the Federal Assembly had revised its decision to stay in 
Bonn in September 1996 also the Federal States established their representations in Berlin. In total, 
about 600 employees moved between 1998 and 2003, plus about 70 members of the Federal 
Assembly.  
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The majority of foreign representations decided to relocate their seats from Bonn to Berlin. 
Most of embassies chose to be present in Berlin when the German government took up its work in 
1999 and made short-term arrangements to accommodate their staff. Besides renting offices and 
apartments the embassies use the facilities of their consulate generals and branch offices as well as 
former military missions until they could rebuild or construct a suitable building for their 
representation (Gehrcken, 2013). Though the diplomatic building stock in Berlin-West had been 
almost entirely destroyed between 1939 and 1945 many countries still owned a parcel of land in West-
Berlin. The former embassies in Berlin-East had closed in 1990 when the GDR became part of the 
FRG. Some reopened later on as representations in the FRG. Today 163 states are represented in 
Berlin by 158 embassies and five honorary consulates.  
To compensate Bonn for its loss of employment several federal offices moved from Berlin to 
Bonn in 1999 and 2000. Berlin also lost several of its prior functions to the New Länder. The 
recommendations of the federal commission concerned several Berlin-based institutions that moved 
in the subsequent years. Before reunification, 28,000 employees had worked for federal offices in 
Berlin (Guerra, 1999). The two relocation programs concerned about 8,700 positions. 
A.2. Data Collection through Independent Sources 
Due to lack of official sources on public sector employment, we embarked in an extensive data 
collection exercise, gathering information on three main variables: the number of jobs of each 
relocating institution before and after the move; the year the institution moved in or out of Berlin; 
and the new address of the institution in Berlin or the former address in Berlin of those institutions 
that were relocated to Bonn and the New Länder. We could also obtain information on the number of 
government employees working in Berlin in 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2004. Those figures were retrieved 
from official documents (BT-Drucksache) and an issue of the Spiegel, a weekly nationwide 
newspaper (Bornhöft et al., 2001). The number of relocated jobs of federal institutions was equally 
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retrieved from official documents (BT-Drucksache). The Berliner Zeitung, a daily newspaper based 
in Berlin published information on the number of employees in the federal administration and 
parliamentary groups, as well as the number of deputies and their employees in 1999. We attributed 
1998 employment levels to the Länder representations which were published in the Generalanzeiger, 
a local newspaper in the Bonn region.  
The collection of embassy personnel data proved more difficult and required us to make a few 
assumptions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt) publishes each year a list of 
diplomatic staff in foreign embassies that have a representation in Germany. From these documents, 
we retrieved the number of diplomatic staff located in Germany in 1996 and use it as the pre-treatment 
level. As the documents do not contain any information on embassy workers covering administrative 
or technical support positions, we assume that their number is proportional to the number of 
diplomatic staff and estimate the total number of workers in each embassy based on the total of people 
registered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs registers also 
family members, we have to make additional assumptions to derive the number of actual embassy 
personnel. We recognize that it is difficult to make reasonable assumptions about the family 
composition of embassy members. Nevertheless, we assume that the average household size of an 
embassy member is approximately 2.5 and get an estimate of a total of 6,300 embassy personnel. By 
double checking this number against a total of 10,000 embassy workers, media representatives and 
employees of lobbying organizations that moved from Bonn to Berlin during the relocation program, 
we conclude that a number of this magnitude seems reasonable and use it in our analysis.  
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Table A.2: Details on data sources 
Relocated institution Year Source of employment data Source of address in Berlin 
Federal Ministries 1997 BT-Drucksache 13/9537 OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
 1999 BT-Drucksache 14/1601 OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
 2001 Spiegel 18/2001 "Die Wacht am Rhein" OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
 2004 BT-Drucksache 16/158 OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
    
Embassies 1996 Liste der diplomatischen Missionen Senatsverwaltung Berlin, 
  in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1998 Liste der diplomatischen Vertretungen 
Federal Institutes 1999 BT-Drucksache 12/2853 Drucksache 15/875, 
(New Länder) 2003  OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
    
Federal Institutes  Teilungskostenbericht fuer das Jahr 2009 Drucksache 15/875, 
(Bonn compensation)   OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
Representations of 1998 Bonner General-Anzeiger, 09.02.1998, "Verkaufen, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 
the Länder  vermieten, verwerten: Abschied der Länder" OECKL Taschenbuch des öﬀentlichen Lebens 
    
Deputies and deputee 1999 Berliner Zeitung 05.07.1999, "Die Bonner Anschriftenverzeichnis des Bundes 
employees, Factions,  kommen: Bundestag startet oﬃziellen Umzug"  
Federal Parliament    
Bundestag) and    
administration    
Oﬃce of the 1998 Berliner Zeitung 24.11.1998, "Bauminister übergibt Anschriftenverzeichnis des Bundes 
Federal President  Schlüssel für das neue Bundespräsidialamt"  
Federal Assembly 2000 Handelsblatt 31.07.2000, "Bundesrats- Anschriftenverzeichnis des Bundes 
(Bundesrat)  Umzug nach Berlin fast abgeschlossen"  
